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The dynamic behavior of a simple macroeconomic disequilibrium mode1 is 
analyzed in which consumers’ changes in money holdings constitute the dynamic 
link between any two periods. It is shown that, uuder constant government 
consumption, a constant production function (no investment), and fixed prices 
and wages, stationary states of Keynesian unemployment are stable whereas 
those of repressed inflation are globally unstable. Possibilities of unemployment 
and output cycles are indicated for fixed wages as well as for some very simple 
class of wage and price adjustment mechanisms. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Disequilibrium phenomena in dynamic economic models have been 
treated until recently largely in two separate areas of economic theory. 
the one hand, models in the Walrasian tradition treated e~~~~s~ve~~ price 
adjustment processes of the tatonnement type where prices in all markets 
respond to excess demand. Actual trade in these models is delayed until the 
equ~librjum price system is reached. No information or insight into the 
dynamic development of other economic variables becomes available. The 
few existing models of the nontatonnement type where actual trade occurs at 
d~seq~i~~briurn prices do not seem to have increased the ~~dersta~d~~g of 
typical disequilibrium phenomena like, for example, unemployment or 
inflation. On the other hand, following the tradition ef business cycle theory, 
income-expenditure models have in almost all cases ignored price and wealth 
effects in their analysis. Most of these models use a large list of ad hog 
assumptions about the behavior of economic agents which Lack a rigorous 
microeconomic foundation in most cases. Although both models 
increased our understanding of some dynamic phenomena, their ge 
results cannot be considered to have increased our u~ders~aud~~g of dis- 
equilibrium situations. 
Two major innovations in economic model buii ing have recently 
revealed important insights into the structure of shor run diseq~~ibr~~m 
~he~orne~a. If combined appropriately they may help to solve many of the 
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problems which had to remain unsolved in all previous approaches. One of 
these innovations consists of a rigorous treatment of the important and well- 
known feature that at any state of disequilibrium rationing on some markets 
due to excess demand or excess supply will have effects on other markets. This 
will normally lead to a revision of plans of all agents concerned and thus to 
different trades than those planned for the other markets, even if excess 
demands there were zero before. Hence, the concepts of notional (Walrasian) 
demand and supply lose their trade determining significance. This has led to 
the formulation of models with quantity rationing describing the concepts of 
constrained demands and supplies. The second innovation constitutes a 
major contribution to the understanding of the role of money in an inter- 
temporal model where future prices are uncertain and where future markets 
for commodities do not exist. Under such circumstances expectations about 
future prices and the possibility to transfer money from one period to the 
next determine in a natural way the demand for money of any agent with 
intertemporal preferences. Thus, the effects of money balances as well as of 
prices on consumption and production decisions can be analyzed. Moreover, 
even if all other economic parameters, e.g., prices, expectations, etc., remain 
unchanged from one period to the next, the savings decision creates the 
dynamic link between any two periods. Unless a stationary state has been 
reached this change in money holdings will have important effects on the 
resulting trades in all following periods. A full understanding of these 
intrinsic dynamic elements is fundamental for a general appreciation of any 
dynamic model in general. 
The model presented here analyzes the dynamic behavior of a simple 
macroeconomic system where the change in money balances constitutes the 
major link between any two subsequent periods. We establish the dynamic 
features under the two different disequilibrium situations which have been 
called Keynesian unemployment and repressed inflation in models where 
prices are fixed in any period and trades are determined through quantity 
rationing. It will be shown that the Keynesian situation is globally stable 
whereas the intlationary is not, if all prices and wages remain fixed. Sequences 
of Keynesian equilibria, on the other hand, though generally monotonically 
converging to a stationary state, may also show cyclical behavior. Thus, an 
employment and an output cycle is obtained. Moreover, it will be shown that 
for any “simple” price adjustment mechanism of the Walrasian type, the 
system tends to be either globally unstable or cyclical, except on a “small” 
set of initial states. Our results confirm with some modifications the general 
presumption of global and monotonic stability of income-expenditure 
models under Keynesian unemployment. On the other hand, they seem to 
indicate a general instability of Walrasian equilibria, even if these are sta- 
tionary, and a persistence of disequilibrium, an argument which has been put 
forward recently in a different context (see Varian [14]). 
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2. EFFECTIVE DEMAND AND Sumxy 
The basic model used here is an aggregative and simplified version of 
Grandmont and Laroque [lo] with completely fixed prices and wages for any 
given period. Most of the comparative statics properties of such models were 
discussed along with other basic issues in Barro and Grossman [2]> Dixit [6], 
and Malinvaud [13]. Our diagrammatic representation will in some parts be 
similar to the one given by Barro and Grossman. 
A consumption good, labor, and money are the only three commodities in 
the economy. Consumers are concerned with two periods. Trade is carried 
out at fixed prices in each period with no possibility of future contracts. Since 
prices in the subsequent period are unknown consumers form subjective 
ex~ectatiQ~s on prices in the next period which are assumed to be held with 
certainty and independent of currently observed rationing. Money serves as 
the only store of value to be carried over from one period to the next. Market 
clearing is achieved by quantity rationing on the long side of each market. 
Given these data consumers will decide on an optimal consumption plan for 
the current period given prices and wages, their initial money holdings: 
expectations, and the possible rationing levels on either market. For our 
simple model here, this implies that in case of unemployment consumers 
express their effective consumption demand, and in case of general excess 
demand for goods they express their effective labor supply. 
Let M, denote total real balances at the beginning of period t and let W: 
denote real wages in period t. If rationing on the labor market occurs at an 
aggregate level L, aggregate effective consumption demand will be a function 
of M, , IVt , and of L. Let X, = C,(M, , W, , L) denote effective consumption 
demand. Symmetrically, if rationing occurs on the commodity market at a 
level X, then effective labor supply will be a function A,(M, , IV,, X). 
According to the underlying utility maximization for the co~str~cti~~ of these 
two functions, there exist X*(M, , W,) and L*(M, , WJ such that 
Furthermore, L 3 L*(M, , W,) implies 
and X 3 X*(M, ) IV,) implies 
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L*(M, , WJ and X*(M, , WJ represent unconstrained labor supply and 
consumption demand, respectively. We will assume throughout that all 
functions are continuously differentiable in their respective domains. In 
addition the following more specific assumptions will be made. 
(Cl) For all M, > 0, W, > 0, L 2 0 
(0 C#& , W , L> 2 0, 
(ii) C,(O, W, , 0) = 0, 
(iii) aC,/al\l, > 0, ac,ja w, > 0, ac,jar, > 0. 
(C2) For all Mt 3 0, Wt > 0, X 3 0 
(0 &(A&, Wt , X> > 0 if W, > 0, 
(ii) aA,jaM, < 0, aA,/aw, > 0, aA,px > 0. 
(C3) For all Mt > 0, W, > 0 
(0 X*Wt , Kl > 0 and L”Wt , WJ > 0, 
(ii) ax*/aM, > 0, ax*pw, 5 0, 
(iii) aL*/akft < 0, aL*jawi > 0. 
A few remarks about these assumptions are in order. An increase in money 
balances increases consumption demand and decreases labor supply. This 
implies that both the commodity and leisure are normal goods. On the other 
hand a positively sloped labor supply curve with respect to the real wage 
requires that the substitution effect in labor dominates the income effect. The 
fact that these effects preserve the sign under rationing is suggested by the 
Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle which also implies that the real wage effect 
is smaller under rationing than without. Finally, the positive slope of effective 
consumption with respect to employment is equivalent to a positive mar- 
ginal (real) propensity to consume. Similarly, the positive slope of effective 
labor supply with respect to commodity rationing reflects a positive marginal 
willingness to work. These assumptions are fairly standard on the individual 
level and have been used widely elsewhere (see, for example, Barro and 
Grossman [2], Dixit [7], Malinvaud [13]). They can be deduced for the 
aggregate level with appropriate assumptions on initial money holdings and 
on the rationing mechanism. 
A more restrictive element of these assumptions, however, is the neglect of 
distributional effects of money balances which, in general, play an important 
role in the determination of effective demand and supply. (For some more 
explicit analysis of distributional aspects, see Dehez and Jaskold Gabszewicz 
[S] and Hildenbrand and Hildenbrand [12].) 
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The production sector is characterized by a twice ~o~tinuo~s~y differen- 
tiable, strictly increasing, atemporal production function Y = f(L) relating 
current labor input L to current output Y. In this simple framework no 
storage will be possible and an intertemporal reasoning for expected profits 
will play no role. Therefore, there is no need for producers to hold money. 
Unconstrained profit maximization in the current period determines output 
Y*( W,) and labor demand %*( W,) as 
and 
Pn case of rationing for the producer on the goods market at a level Y, his 
efiective labor demand Ly( W, , Y) is determined by 
LY(W< > y> = f-V>, Y < YX(Wf), 
Similarly, his effective supply Y,( W, , L) in case of rationing on the labor 
market is determined by 
The function f has the additional properties: 
(i) f(0) = 0, limL-mf(L) = 00, 
(ii) f’(0) = co, 0-7 
(iii) f’ > 0, f" < 0. 
Apart from concavity off, (P> implies that, for all positive real wages, labor 
demand Z*(W,) is always positive and that for any feasible state of the 
producer profits remain nonnegative. 
As the third sector in the economy we introduce the government which 
plays the role of a passive consumer with some fixed strictly positive demand 
g for commodities and that of a financial clearing house between consumers 
and producers. It is assumed that government demand is financed by profits 
and, if necessary, by de&it spending. Therefore, at any feasible state of the 
economy, at which the government is not rationed in its demand, the well- 
known equality of government expenditure with the sum of savmgs and 
profits obtains. 
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3. EQUILIBRIA AND DISEQUILI~RIA 
Given any initial situation (M, , W,), seven distinct possible cases of 
equilibria and disequilibria may occur depending on an equal number of 
market clearing conditions in this economy. 
(1) Walrasian temporary equilibrium (WE). 
In this case no rationing occurs on either market, i.e., 
and 
x*w, 2 Wt) = f(z*( WJ) - g 
L"(M,, W,) = z*(wt). 
(2) Unconstrained demand and supply of consumers and rationing of 
the production sector on the labor market, i.e., 
and 
x*of, , WJ = m*o4 > WJ) - g 
with 
L*wt, Wt) = f-yx*vft , K) + g> 
In this case producers realize their effective supply of goods, but production 
occurs at a level where the marginal product of labor exceeds the real wage. 
(3) Unconstrained demand and supply of producers and unemployment 
for consumers, i.e., 
and 
L”(M, , W,) > z*(wt). 
(4) Unconstrained demand and supply of producers and excess 
demand of consumers, i.e., 
and 
X”(M, , WJ > f(z*( WI - g* 
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In all of these four cases at most one sector is in ~sequ.~libri~m and rationing 
occurs in one market only. These have to be considered as borderline cases 
between the following three which describe the true disequilibrium situations. 
(5) General excess supply or Keynesian dis~qui~.~bri~m ( 
Such a disequilibrium is defined by a solution L of the set of inequalities 
and of the equation given by 
GW,, wt, L> =f(Ll -g, 
L < Z”( WJ. L < L”(iwt ) WJ. 
Equivalently, a pair (Y, L) is a Keynesian disequilibrium if it satisfies effective 
consumption demand and elective labor demand, i.e., 
and 
L,(Wt, Y)=L. 
(6) General excess demand or repressed inflation diseq~~ibrium (I). 
The disequilibrium is defined by a solution L of 
and 
L < z*m, xyA& ) W,) > f  (L) - g. 
As before, an equivalent form is given by a solution (I’“, L) such that 
and 
(7) Unconstrained demand and supply of producers with unemploy 
ment and excess demand for goods (classical disequilibrium (C)). 
This is defined by a solution 
L = z*(wJ 
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GWt , r/v, , 0 > f CL> - g 
and 
4iMt , Wt 3 f (0 - d > z*(W). 
Figures 1 and 2 depict in (X, L)-space two typical disequilibrium situations 
which may arise for alternative (Mt , W,). The Keynesian solution is given by -- 
the coordinates (L, 1) of Fig. 1. (L, X) of Fig. 2 indicate the solution of 
repressed inflation. The other five possible cases can easily be visualized 
FIGURE 1 
using this diagram. It should be noted, however, that no clear conclusion 
can be drawn on the type of disequilibrium which will result from a simple 
comparison of the Walrasian demand and supply levels of the two sectors. 
For example, (L*, X*) Q (Z*, f (Z*) - g) may result in either one of the 
xt C&ftX%~) (L*X’, 
’ iz:ftz*)-g) 
x .,.,..,,.,,,,,...,. I .,.,.....,.,..,......” , .. 
la. 
ft.) B &M&-W 
k 
FIGURE 2 
two typical disequilibrium situations, Keynesian, or inflationary. Further- 
more, given our monotonicity assumptions of C, in L and of A, in X, any 
state other than the Walrasian equilibrium will show a lower level of 
employment and a lower level of output than at the Walrasian equilibrium. 
Hence excess demand in the goods market does not guarantee employment 
of all labor willing to work at the given wage rate. Moreover, the marginal 
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product of labor will be higher than the wage rate at all Keynesian and 
inflationary states. 
For the subsequent analysis, in particular for a description of the dynamic 
development of this economy it is indispensable that at most one of these 
possible cases occurs for any arbitrary initial position (Mt, W,). The rest of 
this section will therefore be devoted to the statement and proof of a general 
uniqueness theorem. To achieve this result the following additional 
assumption is required. 
(9 4@fi , K , 0) > f-W with g > 0, 
(ii) -tg Cut 3 w, ,J7 < f’(Q for all 8 < & < Z*(W& 
for all X and L satisfying X = f(L) - g. 
Assumption (A) involves elements of both the consumption as well as of 
the production side. For a uniqueness theorem this seems to be an indis- 
pensable procedure. Part (i) indicates that the amount of labor necessary to 
produce the quantity of commodities demanded by the government is always 
smaller than the actual labor supplied even under the most severe rationing 
of consumers. This makes it possible to describe disequilibrium states in 
which the government is never rationed. Part (ii) guarantees a “normaP 
multiplier. a stronger but more intuitive assumption would be that the 
marginal propensity to consume (acujaL)(ljwt) is less than one (see, for 
example, ildenbrand and Hildenbrand [12]). Part (iii) is the counterpart of 
(ii) for the case of repressed inflation. Pt guarantees a “‘normal” suppIy 
multiplier. 
THR~RBNP. Let W = f’(L) luheref(l) = g. If(k), (Cl)-(C3), cknd (P) hoM3 
the?z, flu any (Mt, WJ with Mt > 0 and 0 < Wg < p, there exists cme and 
only one of the seven possible disequilibrium situations. 
ProoJ Let K : R, + R and I : R, -+ R denote the following two furc- 
tions. 
and 
188 VOLKER B&IM 
One can easily verify that K(0) > 0,1(O) < 0. For L -=c L*(M, , W,) one has 
K(L) > I(L), and for L > L*(M, , IV,), K(L) = I(L). Furthermore, K is 
strictly decreasing and I is strictly increasing for all L < L*(M, , W,). 
Hence at least one of the functions must have a zero for L E [0, L*(M, , W,)]. 
If they both have one then they occur at L*(Mt , IV,). Otherwise at most one 
has a zero in [0, L*(M, , WJ]. One can now directly verify the following 
seven mutually exclusive cases which correspond to the seven different 
disequilibrium situations defined above where the same numbering has been 
used. Except for case (7) all zeroes L of either K(L) or of I(L) are such that 
L < Min{Z*(W,), L*(M, , kv,)} where E is the equilibrium level of employ- 
ment. If L > Z*(W,) then clearly the classical case prevails and the equili- 
brium is obtained at Z*(lQ. 
E = L"(M,, W,)= z*(w,) (1) 
and 
if and only if 
and 
K(E) = I(E) = 0 
x*&f, 3 WJ = f(z*wtN - g 
if and only if 
and 
L”(K > K) = f-‘w*(~t 9 6) + d. 
L”W, , WJ > z*(wd 
and 
if and only if 
(2) 
(3) 
and 
and 
if and only if 
and 
and 
if and only if 
and 
L < L*(M,, w,), 
if and only if 
e < zy W,), 
and 
&(W , Wt , f @I - g> = E 
,x*6% 5 JG) > f (-0 - g- 
NZ”wt)) > Q and ~@*wt)$ -=c Q (7) 
if and only if 
and 
cuwt, W,? z*Pm >fw*w& -g 
AOft , W, , f (Z*(WJ) - g> > Z*W-d. 
hue to the above result, the state space (Mt , W,) can now be divided into 
64+7lw 
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three mutually exclusive regions of Keynesian, classical, and inflationary 
disequilibria where the other four cases determine the boundaries of these 
regions. Some straightforward calculations yield the slopes for the three 
respective boundaries. Using (2) which determines the boundary between 
Keynesian and inflationary states, one obtains 
ax* aL* 
dM, aw -f’ aw, -- 
dW (2) ax* aL* ' 
aJ& -f’ aM, 
which may be positive, zero, or negative. Similarly for the boundary between 
Keynesian and classical states, which is determined by (3), one obtains 
ac, 
dW, a& =- 
dN (3) ac, az* ac, 
aw, + aw, aL 4 -f’) * 
f’ > aC,/aL, aZ*ja W, < 0, combined with the other assumptions, deter- 
mines a negative slope. Finally, from (4) one obtains for the boundary 
between classical and inflationary states 
dW, =- 
dMt (4) 
which has a positive slope using our assumptions. The associated diagram- 
matic representation of these properties (Fig. 3) corresponds to the one 
obtained by Barro and Grossman, to which we will also add the iso-employ- 
ment-loci for the three different regions. Their slopes and orientation can be 
obtained from our assumptions in a straightforward manner. The three 
regions have been labeled K, C, and I, respectively. The iso-employment-loci 
are given for levels of employment L, < L, < L, . Maximum employment 
is achieved at the Walrasian equilibrium WE. 
w n X3) 
(4) 
c 
--_--- -- 
>, I --__- - I 
~ 
: L, ,G :: 
', : : :7---L3 
1,:‘ $-.L2 
x 1,' 'izL1 1 \: 
(2) 
M 
FIGURE 3 
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4. THE D~mh41cs 0~ DI~EQ~JILIRRIUM SAVHWS 
The dynamic behavior of the model embodies two distinct elements which 
play a diierent role in the determination of the time path. On the one hand, if 
disequilibrium states of the kind described persist over several periods prices 
and wages will eventually change. Little is known at present about how to 
model such a price and wage adjustment mechanism. On the other hand, 
even at nixed prices and wages, the savings behavior of consumers dekermlnes 
the natural dynamic link between any two successive periods which impkies 
changes in money holdings in the economy. As long as these persist employ- 
ment and output changes will occur from one period to another. stb 
phenomena price and savings adjustment would bave to be considered in a 
general dynamic model. However, it seems important to analyze the savings 
adjustment separately since it indicates some relevant properties of the en- 
dogenous dynamic structure of the model. The first part of this section 
therefore analyzes the impact of savings on the dynamic development keepmg 
prices and wages fixed. This does not mean, however, that we are not aware 
of the necessity of introducing price and wage changes as well. The seeon 
part, in which some real wage adjustment is introduced, presents two 
examples which can only serve as a general indication of some qualitative 
properties. Nevertheless we feel it is worthwhile to point out these properties. 
In order to understand the dynamic behavior of the model some additional 
features which concern the role of the government have to be made more 
the government plays only the role of a passive consumer 
nsumption of g the usual accounting identities of total spending 
es and total income generated (i.e.; profits p3ms wage income) 
imply that government consumption in any feasible state is equal to real 
profit ph~s real savings. Combined with the assumption that consumers 
receive no profit payments this is equivalent to thee assumption that all 
profits are taxed and go to the government to finanjce its consumption. 
profits are insufficient this implies deficit spending and money creation on the 
part of the government which, in turn, increases cash balances of consumers. 
Conversely, profits larger than government co~s~rnl~tio~ decrease private 
money holdings which implies money destruction. Therefore all stationar 
states generate profits, i.e., taxes, exactly equal to government spending an 
therefore involve a balanced budget, a necessary condition for stationarity~ 
The profit distribution scheme seems very special, but it captures the basie 
feature of a fixed government consumption plan under variable government 
receipts and its implications on the money holdings of the private sector. On 
the other hand, the qualitative properties of the model would remain un- 
changed if some part of the profits goes to consumers. For a model with the 
sadme featitres, see, e.g., Futia [9] and Malinvaud [13], for one which includes 
some distribution of profits, see Barre and Grsssman [a]. 
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It is clear from the previous remarks that the activities of the production 
sector do not depend on monetary phenomena, i.e., no money is accumulated 
in that sector. Moreover it is assumed that accumulation of capital is not 
possible since no investment activity is included. The model therefore 
preserves the short-run structure in spite of the fact that the dynamic develop- 
ment over several periods is considered. 
From the structure of the model it is clear that only a particular choice of 
M, W, and of g will result in zero savings at the Walrasian temporary equili- 
brium, thus making the pair (M, W) a stationary point of the dynamic 
system. Hence, for an arbitrary but fixed g, which in our case has to be in 
line only with assumption (A), the Walrasian temporary equilibrium will not 
be stationary in general. Therefore, the dynamic analysis will not be concerned 
with the stability or instability of this particular equilibrium. The case of a 
stationary Walrasian temporary equilibrium is discussed extensively by 
Dehez and Jaskold Gabszewicz [S]. Stationary states in our analysis will be 
either of the Keynesian or of the inflationary type. Classical disequilibria 
will not arise by restricting the range of the real wage. 
Letting W remain constant at some level such that for alternative values of 
A4 either Keynesian or inflationary states are obtained, the following two 
systems of equations determine the time path of real balances. If (M, , W) is 
Keynesian, then 
M t+1 - Mt + G(Mt , w, L,) - w-b = 0, 
Lt - f-YGA~t 2 w, Lt) + g) = 0. 
If (44, , W) is inflationary, then 
(K) 
M t+1 - Mt + Yt - g - t&(Mt , W, Yt - g) = 0, 
Yt -f(A,(K , w, & - d> = 0. 
(1) 
Denoting actual savings under the Keynesian situation by S,(M, , W) and 
under repressed inflation by S&V&, IV), the loci of stationary values of 
(M, W) can be obtained for the two different regions by some straightforward 
calculations. For any Keynesian situation one obtains 
ds, 2!sL. f’ - w 
dill, K = aik?$ ac 
f’ - * 
and 
_ i 
ac 
L f’-$y > 
ac, 
ds, j - aw (f’ - w> 
dW IK M,&onst f’-?$ 
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The first term is negative. The numerator of the second. expression is positive. 
The second term of the denominator will be small for high wages which makes 
the whole term positive, possibly negative for low wages. Hence, 
determines the slope of the locus of stationary points, which is positive for 
high wages, possibly negative for low wages. 
For situations of repressed inflation one obtains in a similar fashion 
which is positive, and 
which is positive for high wages, possibly negative for low wages. ~berefore, 
which indicates a downward sloping locus for high wages, possibly upward 
sloping for low wages. 
Combining these results in our phase diagram, one obtains the ~hara~te~za~ 
tion given in Fig. 4. The diagram has been drawn for the ease of positive 
FIGURE 4 
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savings at the Walrasian temporary equilibrium. Some straightforward 
arguments show that any two stationary states of the Keynesian and of the 
repressed inflation type with the same wage rate generate the same level of 
employment. 
The qualitative analysis done so far confirms some properties which one 
might have expected on intuitive grounds. If savings are positive, at the 
Walrasian temporary equilibrium, then a trajectory of M with the “correct” 
real wage will pass through WE but eventually generating repressed inflation. 
Employment will rise as long as such a path is Keynesian, and it will fall as 
soon as it passes into inflationary states. Furthermore, high real balances will 
always be associated with states of repressed inflation. If they are high 
enough the rationing on the goods market will in all cases force consumers 
into additional savings, thus increasing real money balances even further. 
Given the underlying expectations this will create more inflationary pressure. 
All stationary states of repressed inflation are globally unstable. 
A symmetric argument for stationary Keynesian states does not hold, 
except possibly for low real wages. The global stability of such states for a 
large range of real wages is in sharp contrast with the previous result. It 
indicates that for the fixed level of government consumption the system may 
get trapped in a stationary Keynesian state with a low level of employment. 
The comparative statics properties of the model indicate, however, that an 
increase in government consumption is a remedy to increase employment 
(see, for example, Malinvaud [13] or IIildenbrand and Hildenbrand [12]). 
Not all properties of the actual dynamic development can be deduced from 
the previous qualitative analysis of the phase diagram. Let F,(M, , w> = 
?d$+, and FI(Mt , PI’) = M,,, denote the two solutions of the two systems 
(K) and (I), respectively. Since 
aF 
aw 
and 
we have 
$>l 
t 
since 
ds, 
dM, I > ’ 
and 
= 
dS 
d W ,,it=const 
dS 
dM, 
and 
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Assuming for the moment that 
one obtains a family of upward sloping functions, one for each value of W 
(see Fig. 5). Using these, the dynamic development can be deduced direct!y 
as being monotonically convergent to a Keynesian situation for ah initial 
states M, not too large. For large MO, the system diverges mo~oto~ca~~y” 
ne converging path for W = W, has been indicated 
FIGURE 5 
Closer examination of the total savings effect of real balances under 
Keynesian unemployment dS,/dM, jK shows that none of the assumptions 
made so far guarantees that it will be greater than minus one. Hence 
will be less than minus one if 
acu > 1 -zig’ and 
with one strict inequality. The first condition simply implies that on the 
aggregate level future consumption (i.e., final money holdings) is an inferior 
good, The second indicates an elasticity of consumption with respect to 
employment which is greater than one. Both conditions are related to a 
strong preference of present consumption over future consumption which 
induces more than a proportionate decrease in savings with respect to real 
balances. If this case occurs then 
and the associated dynamic development will follow a cyclical time path in 
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the Keynesian region (see Fig. 6). Hence any convergent path will ultimately 
cycle in the Keynesian region inducing a general employment and output 
cycle. For extreme cases of inferiority which imply a savings effect of 
(dS,/dM& < -2 the system will be cyclically divergent. 
MO Mt 
FIGURE 6 
5. SOME REMARKS ON DISEQUILIBRIUM PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
The previous section clearly indicates that the dynamic properties of this 
simple macroeconomic model are typically not of the kind which is usually 
assumed or deduced in the normal multiplier theory. Convergence, though 
monotonic, may lead to low levels of employment if savings are negative and 
if prices and wages are rigid for some time. Cyclical behavior may be an 
outcome of consumers’ strong preference for present consumption indepen- 
dent of any lag or adjustment structure which is usually taken to be the sole 
origin of such dynamic properties. If such elements were introduced here it 
seems clear that they would increase the possibility for cycles rather than 
reduce it. 
An interesting question which remains and which can be treated in a simple 
manner within the scope of this model is whether a price adjustment 
mechanism of the Walrasian type will increse or reduce the stability proper- 
ties of this model. This possibility of changes in prices and wages is in any 
case imposed on any such model since the extreme short run clearly ends and 
induces such changes if more than a few periods are considered in the 
analysis. Some preliminary attempts toward a general theory of price setting 
behavior have been made recently (see, e.g., Benassy [3] and Grandmont and 
Laroque [IO]). However, they are far from a general theoretical approach 
which could be applied in the present context. We will therefore follow the 
usual ad hoc assumption that prices are governed by excess demand. Within 
the framework here this leads to two alternative regimes which show strong 
qualitative implications for the dynamic behavior of this model. 
If prices and wages adjust according to excess demand in the two regions 
of general excess supply and of general excess demand then prices and wages 
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will move in the same direction. Therefore the real wage may increase or 
decrease depending on the specific adjustment process. Since the real wage 
is the crucial determining factor of consumption behavior apart from real 
balances the change in the real wage plays an important role for the dyuami~ 
development of the system. The remainder of this section presents two 
examples of a price and wage adjustment mechanism which preserves the 
sign of the change of real wages in the two alternative regions. This yields 
two d8erent regimes. Such an analysis can be carried out in purely qualitative 
terms using the elements of the previous more precise analysis in spite of t 
fact that all price changes have an impact on real balances. 
The first regime takes a more classical viewpoint asserting that at dis- 
equilibrium states with unemployment real wages are too high. ages fall 
faster than prices whenever Keynesian disequilibrium occurs. As a counter- 
part it is assumed that wages rise faster than prices under excess demand, so 
that the real wage rises in the region of repressed inflation. 
The second regime is the converse of the first one which may 
using Keynesian arguments. Wages may be rigid downward SQ that prices 
fall faster. This increase of real wages in situations of ~~ern~~oyl~e~t will 
induce a multiplier effect of increasing consumption expenditures which is 
designed to increase labor demand and production. Conversely, in situations 
of repressed inflation prices rise faster than wages, so that an increase will 
reduce demand pressures primarily on the commodity market. 
Figure 7 indicates the dynamic behavior for the nrst regime. It is imme- 
diately apparent that the instability of inflationary states with positive savmgs 
Wf 
FIGURE 7 
is drastically increased and the divergence from W’ is faster than at fixed 
prices leading to lower and lower levels of employment. Tn the Keynesian 
region with negative savings the stability of stationary equilibria is destroyed. 
All successive states will show decreasing levels of employment. For the 
other two regions savings and wage effects may lead on a knife edge path to 
the stationary state W’. All other paths will cross over into one of the other 
two regions, however, and will diverge eventually. 
Figure 8 analyzes the effects of the second regime. Et indicates that the 
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global instability of the previous case is drastically reduced. Many paths, if 
they are diverging, will be cyclical. On the other hand, all paths starting with 
negative savings will tend to be cyclical. In general, one can conclude that 
this regime will typically show nonmonotonic behavior. 
The analysis of this final section is clearly not a rigorous treatment of 
wage-price adjustments in disequilibrium. The intention is simply to express 
a warning against any simple ad hoc adjustment mechanism which takes into 
FIGURE 8 
account only the particular disequilibrium state which has been obtained. 
Much more information and some fine tuning are required to construct an 
adjustment mechanism which results in a stable possibly noncyclical path to 
high levels of employment. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The model ignores many important aspects which, according to our 
present understanding of such systems, have an important impact on the 
dynamic behavior. The most important of these clearly is the elimination of 
distributional effects of the underlying rationing scheme on savings and on 
effective demands and supplies. A second very important restriction is the 
asymmetrical treatment of consumers and producers. While consumers are 
placed in a proper intertemporal environment to describe savings behavior, 
the production sector is represented by an atemporal simple macroeconomic 
production function. No monetary considerations enter into the production 
decisions. 
The dynamic analysis consistently ignores any long run properties of the 
model. It concentrates on the typical “medium” run development which 
should be taken as that number of periods after which a revision of exogenous 
control variables or other parameters occurs if the dynamic process leads to 
undesirable states. How such changes occur and/or how an economic policy 
should be designed constitutes a wide area of new research. 
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